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WAS TV ELECTION NEWS BETTER THIS TIME?
A Content Analysis of 1988 and 1992 Campaign Coverage
Richard E. Noyes, S. Robert Lichter and Daniel R. Amundson
Center for Media and Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
INTRODUCTION
More than any recent presidential campaign, the 1988 campaign
was criticized for shallowness and negativity, on the part of both
the candidates and the news media. According to surveys,
considerable numbers of voters were displeased with the campaign coverage. An October, 1988 poll showed nearly four voters
in ten rated the press' s campaign perf onnance as only fair or poor.
(Times Mirror, 1988) A majority of voters (57%) believed that
news organizations tended to favor one side when reporting
political issues, and half believed that news reports "are often
inaccurate." (Times Mirror, 1989).
It was not just the public that was displeased. Various
critics-among them academics, journalists, and even a few
campaign handlers-cited a now-familiar litany: shrinking sound
bites, a preoccupation with polls, intrusions into candidates'
private lives, and a dearth of substantive policy coverage. The
voters' ability to make an informed choice was the main casualty
of this type of coverage.
According to these critics, candidate rhetoric focused on
the trivial and the negative. Instead of challenging this trend,
television news magnified it. Some candidates in 1988, notably
then-Vice President George Bush, ran negative campaigns, but
were not called to account by the news media. Television adopted
an insider's perspective that relished describing and assessing the
tactics of modern campaigns, while ignoring normative concerns
about those tactics. Writing after the election, Marvin Kalb, a
former network correspondent who now directs Harvard's media
studies program, called the coverage "shallow and distinctly
timid." (Kalb, 1988) He faulted television for not challenging the
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candidates, particularly Bush.
Kalb and others argued that, with the decline of other
political institutions, television had "acquired new responsibilities it did not seek and is poorly equipped to handle." (Kalb, 1988;
also Germond and Witcover, 1989; Broder, 1990) According to
this view, the atrophy of party organizations has left the media,
particularly network television, responsible for instructing voters
about the major issues, screening candidates for their qualifications, and disciplining those candidates whose tactics crossed the
threshold of fairness. In 1988, these critics charged, television
failed to meet its new obligations.
This indictment of 1988 became the intellectual foundation for efforts to reform coverage in advance of the 1992 election.
Myriad articles, speeches, books and symposia were dedicated to
this effort during the three years between the two campaigns. The
result was an unusual consensus on some initial steps to improve
political campaigns by changing television's approach to covering them. These included calls for more news coverage of
substantive issues, increased vigilance against deceptive campaign advertising, and increased assertiveness in setting the
campaign agenda. (Broder, 1990; Russert, 1990) The Washington Post's influential reporter/columnist David Broder called on
political reporters to "become partisan-not on behalf of a candidate or party-but on behalf of the process." (Broder, 1990).
Our content analysis of 1992 network news campaign
coverage provided an unusual opportunity to examine these
attempts to change the focus of election news. The coding scheme
was virtual! y identical to that used in our previous analysis of 1988
election coverage. (Lichter, etal., 1988; Lichter, et. al, 1989) This
permits a direct comparison of television's campaign coverage in
1988 and 1992, specifically in the areas of fairness and substance.
Was the coverage better in 1992? And, at the end of the campaign,
did it leave the public more satisfied than it was four years earlier?
PREVIOUS STUDIES
Content analysis research on television's campaign coverage has
4

concentrated on two areas. First, most studies seek to measure the
relative amount and tone of coverage received by the various
candidates. Second, many have measured the relative proportions
of news going to matters of substance (i.e., policy issues) and
hoopla (i.e., the campaign horse race). Early content studies
concluded that, in its topical approach to campaign news, television is preoccupied with news about the "horse race," and much
less likely to broadcast stories about public policy concerns.
(Patterson and McClure, 1976; Patterson, 1980; Robinson and
Sheehan, 1983) Critics have decried the superficiality of such a
"horse racist" approach to coverage, which schools the electorate
in the processes and stratagems of campaigns rather than informing them of the substantive consequences of their outcomes. Such
coverage, it is argued, diminishes the value and meaning of the
electoral process.
Effects researchers have documented the consequences of
this paucity of policy coverage on voter learning. In 1976,
Thomas Patterson found that, while voters learned about policy
issues from watching extended coverage of the party conventions
and the presidential debates on television, there were no increases
in knowledge associated with daily news coverage. (Patterson,
1980) Analyzing the 1988 campaign, Drew and Weaver (1991)
reported similar findings: voters learned a great deal from
watching televised debates, but little from television's routine
coverage.
Beginning with the 1984 campaign, however, researchers
began to document a shift away from intense coverage of the
campaign horse race. Reviewing the Reagan -Mondale contest,
Clancey and Robinson ( 1985) discovered that "horse race journalism did not represent the most prevalent form of campaign
reporting. Campaign issue pieces were emphasized instead."
They defined campaign issues as non-policy concerns about how
candidates and their campaigns should behave. Such campaign
trail controversies frequently seem ephemeral or trivial. For
example, in the 1984 general election, they found that nearly 40
percent of campaign news focused on campaign issues such as
Reagan's "inaccessibility" to reporters and Bush's post-debate
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boast about "kicking ass."
While campaign issues are arguably more relevant to
voters than horse race news, they are seen by critics as no less a
distraction from the real substance of a campaign. By focusing on
campaign issues, the media shift the spotlight away from issues,
parties and ideology, and instead highlight personalities and
tactics. Coverage of campaign issues contributes nothing to voter
knowledge of substantive policy issues.
In addition to the agenda of campaign news, much content
analysis has addressed the tone and balance of candidate coverage. Many studies have found that the media report favorably on
certain candidates while treating others more skeptically. (Graber,
1984; Robinson and Sheehan, 1983; Adams, 1984; Lichter, et. al.,
1988) Robinson and Sheehan (1983) have suggested that a
"frontrunner bias" accounts for much of this variation. They
argue that candidates who lead in public opinion polls are subjected to more journalistic scrutiny than challengers or underdogs.
Studies of both primary and general election contests have added
considerable credence to this theory since 1980.
In 1984 challenger Gary Hart received a large volume of
good press after the Iowa caucuses and then beat frontrunner
Walter Mondale in the New Hampshire primary. After New
Hampshire, the new frontrunner was the subject of a series of
negative television reports, and Hart subsequently lost to Mondale
in several Super Tuesday contests . (Adams, 1984) Later in 1984,
frontrunner Reagan received substantially more negative press
during the general election than underdog Mondale. (Robinson,
1985) Indeed, candidates and their campaign managers now
attempt to influence news media perceptions of their viability.
Campaigns routinely seek to pin the frontrunner label onto their
rivals, at least until they have secured advantages that can withstand increased press scrutiny.
Thus, the idea of an anti-frontrunner bias, and the notion
that television news avoids covering substance, have both become
commonplace among politicians and media researchers. How
well did these patterns of coverage hold up in the more selfconscious atmosphere of campaign journalism in 1992?
6

1988 vs. 1992: SUBSTANCE
For both 1988 and 1992, we conducted a content analysis of all
presidential campaign stories broadcast on the ABC, CBS, and
NBC evening news programs between January 1 and election day.
stories were selected for analysis if they included references to the
presidential campaign, or if they discussed one or more of the
candidates as presidential contenders. Thus, if the story discussed
Bush solely in his capacity as president, without mentioning the
campaign, it was not included in the sample. This procedure
produced a sample of 2,281 stories in 1988 and 2,386 stories in
1992.
To assess the substance of campaign news, we examined
each report to see how much discussion there was of the campaign
horse race, policy issues, and campaign issues, respectively. We
calculated the share of coverage each topic received, using the
total number of stories in each time period as the base. Each of
these topics was coded independently. Thus, a story could have
been coded as containing discussion of all three topics, or none of
the three.
As Table 1 shows, campaign issues were more prominent
in 1988 campaign coverage than were either policy issues or the
horse race. Bush's choice of Dan Quayle as his running mate, and
criticism over candidate tactics and the campaign process helped
make campaign issues dominant during the conventions and
general election phase. Horse race stories were dominant during
the primary phase of the campaign, but were considerably less
prominent during the fall.
Policy issues, however, were not neglected in 1988. Although the networks aired more stories about campaign issues and
horse race over the course of the entire campaign, the share of
news coverage devoted to policy matters increased significantly
after the end of the primaries. From September through November, policy issues were extensively discussed in nearly 40 percent
of network stories, double the rate of issue coverage during the
primary phase. The networks aired more than 100 stories on the
economy, national defense, and crime during the general election
7

Table 1
ELECTIONNEWS TOPICS OVERTIME
1988 CAMPAIGN
Gen.
Primaries

Conv's

Election

TOTAL

(N)

Polley Issues

19%

30%

39%

28%

610

CampaignIssues

21%

44%

43%

35%

752

Horse Race

51%

12%

25%

31%

684

TOTAL STORIES

890

699

589

2,178

Time Periods: Primaries 1/1/88-6{7/88; Conventions, 6/8/88-9/4/88; General Election,
9/5/88-11{7/88
Note - Totals do not equal 100% because more than one topic may have been coded per story, and table excludes
less frequently covered topics such as past campaigns, nature of the electorate, etc.

phase alone. After the primaries, policy issues consistently
eceived a greater share of coverage than did the horse race.
~ampaign issues overshadowed policy during the summer and
fall, but they hardly drove them off the air.
In many ways, coverage of the 1992 election began where
the previous campaign had ended. As Table 2 shows, news
coverage during the 1992 primaries contained more frequent
discussions of both policy and campaign issues than had been the
case in the 1988 primaries, and less time spent on the campaign
horse race. The heaviest concentration of issue stories occurred
during the weeks prior to the New Hampshire primary, when few
campaign trail events demanded coverage and network control
over the news agenda was greatest. The networks ran lengthy
features detailing the candidates' positions on the economy,
education, health care, and other important issues. The frequency
of issue stories ebbed as the weekly circuit of primary contests
began, but increased after the New York primary. Overall, policy
stories were broadcast about as often as horse race stories during
the 1992 primaries. In 1988, horse race stories outnumbered
policy stories by nearly three to one during the same phase of the
campaign.
Campaign issues also received heavy coverage during the
1992 primaries, mainly as the result of allegations about Bill
Clinton's character. Through the New York primary, a total of
207 network stories featured the Democratic frontrunner, a majority of those (105) raised questions about his character. The
character cloud over Clinton raised the specter of 1988. Even the
charges-adultery and draft dodging-were an echo of the previous campaign. But Clinton's primary victories largely succeeded
in ending the wave of stories about his character.
Campaign issues declined in frequency during the next
two phases of the 1992 campaign, but they remained a visible
presence on the evening news. Clinton's character was revisited
on occasion, but after the primaries it was raised mainly by
Republicans, not reporters. Journalists themselves raised questions about the propriety of the Bush campaign's focus on Clinton's
character. Journalists also squared off against the Perot campaign,
8

Table2
ELECTION NEWS TOPICS OVER TIME

1992 CAMPAIGN

Primaries

Conv's

Gen.
Election

TOTAL

(N)

Polley Issues

32%

40%

32%

35%

829

CampaignIssues

33%

28%

32%

31%

739

Horse Race

33%

15%

35%

27%

649

TOTAL STORIES

828

830

728

2,386

Time Periods: Primaries 1/1/92-6/2/92; Conventions, 6/3/92-9/6/92; General Election,9/7 /92-11/2/92
Note - Totals do not equal 100% because more than one topic may have been coded per story, and table excludesless frequently
covered topics such as past campaigns, nature of the electorate, etc.

raising questions about his character an~ ability to serve_as ~hief
Executive. For the year, the networks aired 739 campaign issue
stories, compared with 752 such stories during 1988.
Policy issues, on the other hand, were given much greater
prominence b~ the networks in 19~2. For the year'. the number of
policy stories mcreased from 610 m 1988 to 829 m 1992, re~resenting an increase from 28 percent to 35 percent of all campaign
news. This represents an inqease of 36 percent in the number of
policy stories, and a 25 percent increase in the proportion of
election coverage devoted to policy issues. Economic issues
dominated the campaign, from New Hampshire through the fall
presidential debates. The state of the economy was featured in
220 election reports, or nearly 10 percent of all campaign stories.
Other economic matters also received heavy coverage, including
raxes (147 stories),jobs (76 stories), and the deficit (71 stories).
The general election period saw the least attention paid to
policy issues and the most given to the horse race, reversing the
dynamics of coverage in 1988. Even the concentration of debates
between October 11 and 19 seems to have increased horse race
coverage at the expense of policy issues. Most stories during
those eight days focused on who won or lost the debates, and any
subsequent movement detected in public opinion polls. The
substance of the debates was usually not repeated in post-debate
coverage, except in stories detailing factual errors made by the
candidates.
At first glance, it is difficult to explain why the amount of
horse race coverage during the general election increased from
1988 to 1992. In each case, the frontrunner held a lead of about
6 to 10 percentage points throughout the fall. Bush took the lead
in 1988 polls following the Republican convention in August, and
his lead remained fairly solid during the general election. In 1992,
Clinton took the lead after his July convention, and it remained
intact for the rest of the campaign. For the most part, polling
results showed no more variation in the fall of 1992 than they had
in the fall of 1988. (Public Opinion, 1~88; Roper Center, 1992)
The data show a substantial increase in horse race news
after October 1, apparently the result of Perot's re-entry into the
9

race combined with the unique concentration of debates. For the
last month of the campaign, the networks aired 196 horse race
stories (compared to 137 on policy issues). During that time, the
three major network news organizations generated their own new
polls at the rate of nearly one per day (Roper Center, 1992), while
also airing the results of polls conducted by rival networks
(especially those of CNN). This cross-reporting of polls, which
was not done in 1988, greatly increased horse race coverage in the
campaign's final days.
Despite the attention given to the horse race in the final
weeks of the campaign, the amount of policy coverage marks a
shift from past network practices. This increase clearly represents
a shifting of news priorities from 1988. Could this simply reflect
changes in candidate behavior or real world events? Certainly,
much of the issue agenda of the campaign had its basis in events,
particularly the economic recession. Also, the 1992 race featured
candidates such as Paul Tsongas, Ross Perot, and Bill Clinton,
whose campaigns touted issues and policy proposals to a greater
degree than typical candidates have in recent years (although past
elections saw their share of issue-oriented candidates, in particular Reagan in 1980 and Jackson in 1984). These factors added to
the amount of issue coverage in 1992, and helped shape the
agenda of policy coverage.
But some of the increase in policy coverage is clearly due
to the actions of the news organizations themselves. Not only had
the networks signalled their intentions during the years between
the 1988 and 1992 campaigns (Russert, 1990), but they had
already begun to shift to a feature-oriented format marked by
diminished attention to the news of the day . During the campaign,
feature segments such as ABC's "American Agenda," CBS's
"Eye on America," and NBC's "America Close Up" routinely
departed from the campaign trail to provide contextual and
thematic coverage of the issues and candidates. The "American
Agenda," in particular, provided discussion of policy issues that
was untainted by talk of campaign strategy or horse race considerations. The increased attention to policy in 1992 seems as much
the result of intentional changes in approach by the journalists
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who cover the campaign, as the result of changes in the campaign
itself.
1988 vs. 1992: FAIRNESS
In examining the tone of candidate coverage, we have sought to

make our results as comparable as possible with data from past
research. Our methodology is based in large part on the
groundbreaking studies of Michael Robinson, whose calculation
of each candidate's good and bad press excluded the implications
of events, polls, and the remarks of partisan sources, including the
candidates themselves. Robinson analyzed the remaining source
and reporter statements to obtain an overall score and categorized
each story as "positive," "negative," or "neutral," based on the
ratio of positive to negative opinions expressed. (Robinson and
Sheehan, 1983; Clancey and Robinson, 1985)
Our analysis was also based on the opinions expressed by
any independent observers quoted in the story, or on the stated
views of reporters themselves. We set aside partisan sources for
the same reason Robinson did, namely, because voters tend to
give them less credence (Robinson and Sheehan, 1983; cf. Page,
et. al., 1987). We counted only statements which explicitly
evaluated a candidate's issue positions.job performance, conduct
as a candidate, ethics, or personal behavior. (We also noted all
assessments of the candidate's status in the campaign horse race,
but analyzed those statements separately from our measure of
good press.)
Unlike Robinson, however, we did not sum the opinions
of all non-partisan sources to provide a story-based analysis of
good press. Instead, our unit of analysis was the individual
evaluative statement (or sound bite) of a source or reporter. This
method of data collection enhanced our ability to describe the
building-blocks of campaign coverage, while avoiding the ambiguity of "neutral" or "balanced" stories that might contain widely
varying amounts of evaluative material. For example, one story
might have contained three favorable comments about Michael
Dukakis from voters, two negative comments from political
11

analysts, and a third negative comment from the correspondent
herself. Another story might contain only one positive and one
negative comment about Dukakis from two voters. Unlike a
story-based analysis that codes both reports as equally "balanced," our system captures the differing amounts of opinion
expressed, as well as the source, target, and direction of each
evaluation.
For each time period we calculated the ratio of positive
opinions to the total of directional opinions expressed about each
candidate. Scores could range from entirely negative (0% positive) to entirely (100%) positive coverage.
Table 3 demonstrates the variability of good press for the
candidates in 1988. Despite these individual variations, however,
there was no strong tilt in favor of one political party over the
other. Among the Democrats, Jesse Jackson, Lloyd Bentsen and
Bruce Babbitt fared best, while Gary Hart received the least
favorable publicity. Republicans Jack Kemp and Robert Dole
received mainly favorable coverage, while Pat Robertson received mostly unfavorable coverage.
While aggregate valuations of the Democratic field were
more favorable than those of their Republican counterparts (by 54
to 43 percent positive), these differences disappeared during the
general election, when the two parties' candidates are directly
compared. Indeed, most of the Democratic margin is accounted
for by coverage of Jesse Jackson. Although Jackson was not
treated as a viable candidate in 1984 (Broh, 1987), his 1988
primary showings helped change that perception. The newfound
strength of his candidacy gave his campaign an historical significance as the first "serious" black presidential candidate, which
endowed his coverage with a uniquely positive cast Excluding
remarks about Jackson, the Democratic field received 46 percent
positive coverage, nearly identical to that of the Republicans.
Coverage of the two presidential nominees, George Bush and
Michael Dukakis, was virtually identical in tone (43% positive
each).
In general, the 1988 data lend greater support to a hypothesis of"frontrunner bias" than to one of partisan bias. Democratic
12

Table 3
EVALUATIONS OF CANDIDATESOVERTIME-1988
(PERCENTPOSITIVE)

Conventions

Gen.
Election

52%

46%
41

37%
19

62
37
56

-

-

57

47
87
92

32
100

Primaries
BUSH
QUAYLE
DOLE
ROBERTSON
KEMP
DUKAKIS
BENTSEN
JACKSON
GORE
GEPHARDT
SIMON
BABBITT

HART
ALLREPUBS
ALLDEMS
ALLCANDS

-

-

TOTAL

(N)

43%
34
62
37
56

318
83
37
57
9

43
92
76

-

-

62
63
80
10

336
24
171
21
39
8
5
21

50

44

34

43

508

~

.fil
53%

ll

.H

~

34%

49%

1,133

-

73
48
62
63
80
10

57%

-

-

48

Time Periods: Primaries l/l/88-6n /88; Conventions, 6/8/88-9/4/88;
General Election, 9/5/88-11n/88
Note - No report for candidates with fewer than five evaluations.

frontrunner Dukakis consistently received more negative coverage than Jackson, his nearest rival. Republican frontrunner Bush
received heavy criticism (72% negative) prior to the Iowa caucuses, where he placed third behind Dole and Robertson. After
Iowa, however, Bush was no longer considered the frontrunner,
and he received his first good press of the primary season (79%
positive). After Bush's New Hampshire victory a week later, his
coverage became less positive (57% positive for the remainder of
the primaries).
But some candidates were given largely unfavorable press
in spite of their longshot status. News coverage ofDemocrat Gary
Hart and Republican Pat Robertson was mainly negative. In
Hart's case, much of the criticism came during the spring of 1987,
when he was still the putative frontrunner in the still-forming
Democratic field (Lichter et. al., 1988). But coverage of Hart
remained distinctly critical after he re-entered the race in late
1987, despite the fact that his support in the polls was much
reduced. Only ten percent of evaluations of Hart were favorable
during the primary season, the lowest of any candidate.
News coverage of Robertson was also mainly negative,
even after his New Hampshire loss effectively ended any chance
of his securing the Republican nomination. The candidate continued to receive considerable scrutiny of his ministry, his beliefs,
and questions over the factual accuracy of many of his statements.
After New Hampshire, only 18 percent of the opinions expressed
about Robertson on the news were positive.
The cases of Hart and Robertson refute the notion that the
press failed in 1988 to accept the responsibility of screening out
unacceptable candidates, a function once performed by political
party bosses. Coverage of both men was dominated by questions
about their personal character and temperamental ability to serve
as president. Both also received a large volume of news coverage,
far more than other candidates with similar poll standings.
But the most striking feature of the 1988 general election
is the precision with which coverage of the two presidential
nominees was balanced. Dukakis and Bush received a nearly
identical number of evaluations (318 to 336, respectively), and
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virtually identical proportions of unfavorable press (57% negative).
This balance, once the sort of statistic journalists would
cite to prove their political independence, was condemned by
some critics of the 1988 coverage. Writing in Newsweek shortly
after the election, Jonathan Alter stated that "By almost any
standard, Bush slung several tons more mud than Dukak.is, who
for weeks was criticized for not fighting back. But misguided
ideas of fairness required that reporters implicate both equally,
lest they be seen as taking sides .... Fear of seeming slanted
overcame any interest in reporting a larger truth." (Alter, 1988)
Others shared this view of a press corps that "bent over backwards
not to seem at all critical of the Republicans." (Miller, 1988) In
this view, it would have been more "fair" to subject Bush to
greater criticism, and thus give Dukak.is more favorable coverage
in light of Bush's campaign conduct.
The rejection of mechanistic "balance" in favor of more
subjective "fairness" permeated many of the reform proposals
which followed 1988. In particular,journalists were encouraged
to take issue with campaign statements or advertisements which
were clearly unfair, incomplete, or misleading in their depiction
of the facts. Such an approach, it was hoped, would prevent future
candidates from dominating the agenda with messages considered beyond the bounds of fairness. Coupled with calls for
increased attention to policy issues and less discussion of the
campaign horse race, these changes offered television viewers the
prospect of a markedly different view of the campaign and the
candidates in 1992. (Broder, 1990; Russert, 1990; Barone Center,
1991)
As Table 4 shows, the two parties received substantially
different coverage in 1992. Every Democratic candidate received
more favorable coverage than any Republican. While some
Democrats, notably Albert Gore, Paul Tsongas and Bob Kerrey,
did better than others, no Democrat fared as poorly as independent
Ross Perot (48 percent positive evaluations). Perot, in turn,
received much more favorable coverage than either George Bush
or Dan Quayle, who each received roughly three times as many
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Table 4
EVALUATIONS OF CANDIDATES OVER TIME-1992
(PERCENT POSITIVE)

Primaries

Conventions

Gen.
Election

TOTAL

(N)

27 %
28
48

926
65
54
644
32
89
62
13
21
426
16

BUSH
QUAYLE
BUCHANAN

16%
22
48

30%
35

31%
16

-

-

CLINTON
GORE
BROWN
TSONGAS
HARKIN
KERREY

44

53
95

52
54

51
73
54
71

-

-

-

50
78
51
73
54
71

-

PEROT
STOCKDALE

65

43

-

-

45
57

48
57

ALLREPUBS
ALLDEMS
ALL PEROT
ALLCANDS

22
52
65
42%

31
57
43
40 %

30
52
46
41%

28
53
48
41%

Time Periods: Primaries 1/1/92-6/2/92; Conventions, 6/3/92 -9/6/92; General Election,
Note - No report for candidates with fewer than five evaluations.

9n/92- 11/2/92

1,045
861
442
2,348

unfavorable as favorable evaluations. The differences between
the parties existed in the primary, convention, and general election phases of the campaign.
As in 1988, coverage during the primaries was typically
most negative toward frontrunners. Bush received less favorable
coverage than his main challenger, Pat Buchanan, while Democrat Bill Clinton received less favorable coverage than his chief
rivals, Paul Tsongas and Jerry Brown. During the primaries, only
44 percent of sources expressed favorable opinions about Clinton,
while his rivals combined for 61 percent favorable evaluations.
Even Perot's coverage fits the frontrunner hypothesis.
Perot began to receive coverage as a prospective candidate in late
March. Through the end of the primaries on June 2, Perot had
received largely favorable coverage (65% positive). On June 3
large percentages of primary voters in several states told exit
pollsters that they would have voted for Perot had he been on the
ballot. Results indicated Perot might have beaten Bush among
California Republicans and Clinton among Ohio Democrats. A
CNN poll taken June 3-4 showed Perot with 37 percent of the
general election vote, compared with 24 percent each for Clinton
and Bush.
Despite the fact that no third candidate had ever won the
presidency before, the poll results validated perceptions of Perot
as the frontrunner of a three-way race. For the next six weeks, until
he withdrew from the race on July 16, the tone of Perot's media
coverage grew increasingly critical. Reporters began investigations into his business practices and perceived inconsistencies in
his stated record. In the final week of his campaign, televised
comments about Perot were nearly 80 percent negative.
Thus, the Perot candidacy fit the pattern: a candidate
develops support while receiving mainly good press, but then
reaches frontrunner status, receives increased criticism, and loses
support. This is the same pattern described by content analysts
reaching back to 1980. Candidates from John Anderson to Gary
Hart to George Bush (in 1980 and 1988), Bob Dole, Jesse Jackson
and Paul Tsongas have alternately benefitted and suffered from its
consistent application over the years.
15

But an interesting development occurred during the 1992
conventions and general election period. In 1988, the tone of
Dukakis' and Bush's coverage had converged during the convention phase, and remained in synch for the rest of the campaign. But
during the convention phase in 1992, Bush received only 30
percent positive evaluations, compared with over 50 percent
positive evaluations for Clinton. During the general election
phase, the situation was virtually unchanged, with 31 percent
good press for Bush, compared with 52 percent positive press for
Clinton.
While other phases of the 1992 campaign also showed
wide variations in the favorable coverage of various candidates,
what makes this discrepancy noteworthy is the relative polling
positions of Bush and Clinton. Clinton led, and Bush trailed, in
every poll taken after the Democratic convention, and Clinton's
lead averaged over 10 percentage points during the fall. (Roper
Center, 1992)
It was not only polls which painted Clinton as a likely
winner. As Table 5 shows, comments by reporters themselves on
television newscasts also described Bush as badly trailing the
Democrat. After the primaries ended, fewer than one in four
reporter statements ever reflected favorably on Bush's status or
chances in the presidential race. After the Democratic convention, when Clinton solidified his lead in opinion polls, never less
than three out of four reporter statements rated favorably Clinton's
chances or status in the campaign horse race.
Thus, Clinton remained the frontrunner throughout the
final four months of the 1992 campaign, both in the statistical
findings of public opinion polls, and in the perceptions of reporters following the race. Yet, as Table 6 shows, the tone of Clinton's
coverage was more favorable than that of Bush during every phase
of the campaign (and, following the Democratic Convention,
more favorable than that of Ross Perot). In no other content
analysis of a presidential election has a clear frontrunner received,
over a sustained period of time, more favorable coverage than his
rivals.
How could a hypothesis that has proven so accurate in the
16

Table S
REPORTERASSESSMENTSOF CANDIDATESSTATUS'
IN HORSE RACE-1992
(PERCENTPOSITIVE)
Pre-Dem
Conv

Dem
Conv

Pre-Rep
Conv

14%

12%

23%

41

90

90

70

16

-

PreDebate

Debate

Final
Days

19%

16%

5%

23%

89

75

82

98

78

-

69

16

42

55

Rep
Conv

PrePerot

9%

(N)

BUSH
980

CLINTON
752
PEROT
484

Time Periods: Pre-Democratic Convention, 6/3/92- 7/10/92; Democratic Convention, 7/11/92-7 /19/92; Pre-Republican Convention, 7/20/92-8/14/
92; Republican Convention, 8/15/92-8/23/92; Pre-Perot, 8/24/92-9/30/92; Pre-Debate, 10/1/92- 10/10/92; Debates, 10/11/92-10/19/92;
Final Days, 10/20/92-11/2/92

Table6
EVALUATIONS OF CANDIDATES OVER TIME-1992
(PERCENT POSITIVE)

Debate

Final
Days

43%

24%

41%

39

61

83

52

37

07

67

51

Pre-Dem
Conv

Dem
Conv

Pre-Rep
Conv

Rep
Conv

PrePerot

BUSH
694

16%

47%

22%

38%

25%

CLINTON
454

34

55

65

62

PEROT
346

52

21

-

-

PreDebate

(N)

Time Periods: Pre-DemocraticConvention, 6/3/92-7/10/92; DemocraticConvention, 7/11/92-7/19/92; Pre-RepublicanConvention, 7/20/92-8/
14/92; RepublicanConvention,8/15/92-8/23/92; Pre-Perot,8/24/92-9/30/92;Pre-Debate, 10/1/92- 10/10/92; Debates, 10/11/92-10/19/92;Final
Days, 10/20/92-11/2192.

past fail to predict the tone of candidate coverage in this instance?
One explanation might be that the anti-frontrunner bias in general
election contests has actually been a surrogate for partisan bias.
From 1980 through 1988, the frontrunner in the fall campaign has
been a conservative Republican; only in 1992 was there a Democratic frontrunner. But this explanation falls short. In 1980,
Reagan and Carter each received roughly equal amounts of
negative coverage (Robinson and Sheehan, 1983); in 1988, Bush
and Dukakis received equally of unfavorable coverage (Lichter,
et. al., 1989) If there is a bias against conservative Republicans,
it should have been evident in both those years as well.
Alternatively, there might be an anti-incumbency bias at
work. Thus, incumbent Reagan received far more negative
coverage than challenger Mondale in 1984. (Clancey and
Robinson, 1985; Graber, 1987) Once again, though, that fails to
explain the roughly equal amounts of bad press that Carter the
incumbent and Reagan the challenger received in 1980.
Could Bush have been perceived as the frontrunner in
spite of the polls, perhaps because of the power of his incumbent
status? As we noted earlier, in the last four months of the
campaign, reporters themselves spoke negatively about Bush's
chances of winning by margins of between four-to-one and ten-toone. (See Table 5) By the fall, campaign reporters clearly
perceived Bush to be the underdog in the race, and said as much.
Perhaps 1992 was an aberration; only the 1996 campaign
and those beyond will tell us whether this is the case. But we
believe that another explanation is in order: Television has
changed the rules of its campaign coverage. In attempting to
referee the campaign, reporters have unwittingly created an
environment in which their own values and beliefs take on
increased importance. Further, in attempting to force the campaign to meet their own perceptions of f aimess, reporters may
actually have damaged their own credibility and public image.
SUMMARY /DISCUSSION
Much of what was new in television's coverage of the 1992
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campaign came about in reaction to what was perceived as wrong
with coverage of the 1988 campaign. Television news was
criticized for being too constrained by campaign trail events,
covering candidate sound bites, photo-opportunities, and attacks
to the detriment of both substance and fairness. Our content
analysis of that campaign casts doubt about this indictment of
television's campaign role. We found that television's coverage
of policy issues increased as the 1988 campaign progressed, while
cov~rage of polls and the campaign "horse race" received diminished coverage over time. We also found no evidence that
television coverage favored George Bush over Michael Dukakis.
Nonetheless, the perception that they had served the
public poorly proved powerful enough to mobilize the networks
to reform their coverage. In 1992, the coverage moved away from
transmitting the events of the day in order to provide more
discussion of policy, and a more independent and disinterested
assessment of the candidates.
The networks certainly achieved their goal of more policy
coverage (at least until the presidential debates took place). But
the question off airness is harder to assess. What was perceived
as "unfair" about 1988 had been the ability of a candidate (in that
case, George Bush) to control the news agenda with his attacks on
his opponent. Those attacks were seen by reporters (among
others) as lacking in the necessary substantiation in reality to be
considered "fair." In 1992, the goal of the networks was to check
the ads, check the facts, counter the rhetoric, and discipline
candidates who roamed too far out of bounds.
CBS News instituted a new feature called the "Campaign
'92 Reality Check." All three networks dedicated at least some
resources to" Ad Watches." Candidate assertions were frequently
contradicted by reporters. Tactics that reporters perceived as
unfair were so labelled. Campaign trail reports no longer presented one campaign's point of view, balanced by the other side's
corresponding report, but rather the reporter's critique of that
candidate's day. Often they included a response from the other
side as well.
In practice, George Bush was by far the most frequent
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target of television's new assertiveness. We coded 152 instances
during the general election in which reporters drew into question
or refuted campaign statements. More than half of these (52%)
focused on Bush campaign, compared with only 24 percent each
for the Clinton and Perot campaigns. Ads were scrutinized in
1992, but they were mostly Bush's ads. Two-thirds (67%) of the
assessments focused on Bush's ads, compared with 19 percent
which targeted Perot's ads and 14 percent for Clinton's. And
most of the comments about Bush's ads (83%) were negative.
Of course, it may be that Bush's actions deserved greater
scrutiny, or more frequent rebuttals, than those of his rivals. If
these differences were solely the result of reporters' attempts to
monitor campaign conduct, however, then viewers should have
been presented relatively balanced coverage of the various candidates' issue positions, personal character, and job performance.
Yet, while Bush was heavily criticized for his campaign conduct-93 percent of sources criticized him on those grounds,
compared with 85 percent who so criticized Clinton-television's
coverage does not become more balanced when such comments
are excluded. Indeed, the gap between the two nominees during
the general election actually increases (34% positive coverage for
Bush, compared with 57% positive for Clinton). If reporters had
never broadcast criticisms of any candidate's campaign conduct,
there would still have been a major imbalance in the tone of 1992
election coverage.
In contrast to 1988, reporters do not appear overly concerned about how the candidates conducted themselves during
1992. A poll of journalists taken in October, 1992, finds that more
than half (55%) believed that Bush's candidacy was hurt by the
way he was covered by the media. When asked why, most cited
his record as president, or the prominence of the economy as an
issue in the campaign; neither the tone nor fairness of Bush's
campaign was cited. (Times Mirror, 1992) As Newsweek noted
just before the election, "The main reason the president has
received a bad press is that he's done badly." (Alter, 1992)
Campaign conduct was not, in 1992, the high-profile issue it was
in 1988. Bush's bad press was not compensation for an unfair
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campaign; it was rooted in journalists' perceptions of a job poorly
done.
Journalists were encouraged after 1988 to retreat from the
campaign trail, provide more analysis and perspective, and keep
the news from becoming hostage to the campaigns' competing
agendas. In large part, this was accomplished. But the force
behind such a shift in approach was concern over the conduct of
the campaign. Reporters gave themselves license to referee the
contest and make it "fairer." But this gave reporters permission
to pick sides and settle disputes among the candidates. It was an
environment where reporters felt freer to use their own judgment
analyzing and assessing the campaign.
Despite qualms voiced during the primaries, most journalists now appear satisfied with this new role in the campaign
process. The Times Mirror survey found that four out of five
journalists rated the 1992 coverage as "good" or "excellent." The
survey also reported that many of the top media people interviewed volunteered that the coverage was much improved from
1988. Two-thirds of reporters rated coverage of policy issues and
particularly the economy as at least good; more than a quarter
(27 %) said that coverage of the economy was "excellent." (Times
Mirror, 1992) Everette Dennis, director of Columbia University's
Freedom Forum Center, recently pronounced the coverage "exemplary." (Dennis, 1993)
By contrast, public dissatisfaction with election coverage
has receded far less. After 1988, 39 percent of the public believed
the coverage to be only "fair" or"poor." (Times Mirror, 1988) A
similar poll in 1992 found 38 percent who gave those ratings.
Fifty-four percent believed that the press has too much influence
on which candidate becomes president. Even worse for the press,
most of the electorate believes that journalists "often" (49%) or
"sometimes" (35%) let their own political preferences influence
the way they report the news. Asked who they thought most
reporters wanted to see win the election, more than half (52 %) said
Clinton; only one in six (17%) said Bush, and only about a quarter
(26%) said they didn't know. (Times Mirror, 1992)
These poll results suggest that journalists may have con-
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-centrated in changing those aspects of campaign coverage that
they were most concerned about, rather than what most concerns
the public. The unexpected popularity of talk shows as an
"unmediated" form of campaign information points in the same
direction. All the changes failed to allay-and may have reinforced-the electorate's objections to intrusive, negativistic, and
partisan news coverage. One result is that the public increasingly
views the press as a partisan player in the electoral process, rather
than as a fair and honest broker of the candidates' competing
claims. In journalism as elsewhere, reforms may carry unanticipated consequences, and their costs must be weighed against their
benefits. If journalists sacrifice their own credibility in an effort
to improve the political process, then journalism, electoral politics, and governance will all share the costs of their good intentions.
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